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威尼斯欢乐娱人城v3676学术报告——孔广文教授

发布者:殳妮   发布时间:2023-08-03   浏览次数:71


威尼斯欢乐娱人城v3676学术报告——孔广文教授


【时间】

2023年8月8日(二)上午

【地点】

威尼斯欢乐娱人城v3676财科馆317会议室

【议程】

09:30-10:30    学术报告

10:30-11:30    在线平台可持续物流运营研讨会


【报告简介】

主题:When Less is More: Analysis and Empirical Evidence of Control Limit Strategies in a Diagnosis Crowdsourcing Platform

摘要:We consider a diagnosis crowdsourcing platform that allows patients to seek multiple medical diagnoses from doctors online. We find that using a commission-based pricing mechanism alone may yield a downward distortion on price to prevent the over-participation of doctors compared to a centralized benchmark. By imposing a control limit on the number of diagnoses received per inquiry, the platform can charge a higher price while maintaining the appropriate number of responses from doctors. When patients are sensitive to delays in receiving diagnoses, interestingly, a platform may benefit from a patient's increased delay sensitivity because it plays a similar role as the control limit by discouraging late-arriving doctors from participating. As a result, the profit improvement from imposing a control limit mechanism may decrease with delay sensitivity. When doctors are heterogeneous in their service quality, the undesirable outcome of low-quality doctors driving out all high-quality doctors may occur. A control limit could not only increase high-quality doctors' participation by increasing their chances of being rewarded by patients but also increase consumer surplus. We empirically test the predictions using data from a large diagnosis crowdsourcing platform and find that it supports the results from the model analysis.


【报告人】Prof. Guangwen KONG (孔广文副教授 美国天普大学福克斯威尼斯欢乐娱人城v3676)

【报告人简介】

Guangwen Kong received her Ph.D. degree in Operations Management from the University of Southern California in 2013.  Her research studies emerging problems in sharing or on-demand platforms, service management and supply chain management using models, experiments, and data analysis, with a focus on behavior, incentive, and their implications to policies and operational decisions.  She has published her papers in leading journals such as Management Science, Manufacturing &Service Operations Management, and Production and Operations Management.

Her research has been recognized by many research awards, including Management Science Best Paper Award in Operations Management (Winner, 2022), MSOM Service Management SIG Best Paper Award (Winner, 2021), POMS HOCM (Humanitarian Operations and Crisis Management) Best Paper Award (Runner-Up, 2021), Post-Pandemic Supply Chain and Healthcare Management Best Paper Award (Winner, 2021), DSI Best Problem-Driven Analytical Research Paper Award (Winner, 2021), CSAMSE Best Paper Award (Third Prize 2019, Honorable Mention 2017), ISCOM Best Paper Award (First Prize, 2019), INFORMS Service Science Cluster Best Paper Award (Finalist, 2018), INFORMS Service Science Cluster Student Best Paper Award (Finalist, Jingxuan Geng, 2020), POMS Supply Chain Management Best Student Paper Award (Finalist, 2013), POMS HK Best Student Paper Award (Finalist, Xiang Li, 2016), POMS CBOM (College of Behavioral Operations Management) Junior Scholar Award (Finalist, 2018) and The NET Institute Summer Grant Award (2018). 

She is an associate editor of Naval Research of Logistics and an editorial review board member of Production and Operations Management. She is a co-editor of INFORMS Analytics Collections on Online Marketplaces.  She has served as an NSF panelist in 2014 and as an INFORMS Doctoral Student Colloquium panelist in 2020 and 2021. She received the M&SOM Meritorious Service Award (2018, 2019, 2020, 2021) and Management Science Meritorious Service Award (2018, 2019).


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