威尼斯欢乐娱人城v3676学术活动
发布者：殳妮 发布时间：2023-05-23 浏览次数：229
威尼斯欢乐娱人城v3676学术活动
时间：2023年5月25日（四）下午
地点：东校区财科馆317会议室
（一）学术讲座
题目：PATIENT CHOICE AND HOSPITAL QUALITY COMPETITION UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION （不完美信息下的患者选择与医院质量竞争）
报告人：Zhan Pang （庞湛）， Purdue University (普渡大学)
时间：2023年5月25日14:00-15:00
摘要Abstract:
Quality information imperfection is one of the most prominent characteristics of hospital markets where quality- and delay-sensitive patients make hospital choice without being fully informed. In a hospital market where hospitals compete on qualities under a regulated fee for service, we are interested in how imperfect quality information impacts patient choice and hospital quality decisions under competition, and whether a policy maker should leverage its payment incentive, or improve the quality information, or both, to govern the market.
To account for the strategic interactions among patients, hospitals, and the policy maker, we employ the notion of rational expectations and the random utility theory to model the patient beliefs on qualities and expected delays and the resulting discrete choice behavior in a stochastic service system. We first characterize the structural properties of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and the Nash equilibria of hospital quality game. We then characterize the impacts of imperfect quality information on patient choice under REE and the equilibrium qualities. Interestingly, we show that improving quality information, though better informing patient choice, may not always lead to better equilibrium qualities.
To provide policy implications, we further analyze the optimal payment rate and quality information improvement effort of the policy maker. We show that the payment incentive and the improvement in quality information tend to be substitutes. In particular, we identify conditions under which it suffices for the policy maker to use the payment incentives as the sole lever, making no effort to improve quality information to better inform patient choice, which implies that financial incentive may dominate quality information accuracy.
This is joint work with Dr. Linggang Qi.
报告人简介Biography:
Dr. Zhan Pang is Lewis B. Cullman Rising Star Professor of Management at Daniels School of Business at Purdue University. His research interests include statistical learning and decision theory, healthcare delivery systems, supply chain risk management, and pricing and revenue management. He is a senior editor of Production and Operations Management, and a founding editor of Journal of Blockchain Research. He had extensive industry experiences as an entrepreneur and a management consultant. He is a board member of a public energy technology company and a non-profit home healthcare service provider and serves as an Innovation and Entrepreneurship Fellow and an Experiential Education Champaign at Purdue. He is the coordinator of the Supply Chain and Operations Management PhD Program at Purdue. He is actively recruiting PhD students and welcoming visiting students and scholars with strong mathematics background and research interest in statistical learning and optimization and their applications in supply chain and operations management.
（二）学术座谈会
汇报嘉宾：胡汉辉教授、王怀清教授、庞湛教授（同上）等
时间：2023年5月25日15:00-16:00
嘉宾简介：
胡汉辉教授，东南大学经济管理学院教授、经济管理学院集团经济与产业组织研究中心主任（RCIO）。主要从事有关产业组织与分析、集团化企业管理、产业集群发展与治理和定量化管理与评价方法的研究与教学工作。先后获国家图书奖、全国统计科学研究优秀成果一等奖、江苏省哲学社会科学优秀成果二等奖和省科技进步三等奖等奖励。先后主持或负责10余项国家科学基金项目。胡汉辉教授30年来一直热心从事创新、创业的教学与实践指导工作。在东大学子中享有很高的声誉。
王怀清教授，1987年获得英国曼彻斯特大学博士学位，曾任职多伦多大学，香港城市大学资讯系统系教授，南方科技大学金融数学与金融工程系教授; 兼任华中科技大学客座教授以及武汉理工大学信息工程学院名誉院长。王怀清教授在人工智能、金融智能和商务智能的研究方面有杰出的成就，是中国最早一批AI科学家，是和杰夫·辛顿是同一时代的顶尖学者。其研究领域涵盖智能金融系统、智能决策支持、智能体、知识管理系统、大数据和互联网金融、概念模型和本体等。王怀清教授已经在 SSCI(社会科学引文索引)/SCI(科学引文索引) 的期刊上面发表了90多篇学术论文,并且被其它SSCI/SCI 的论文索引了2000多次。2014年-2018年， 王怀清教授连续多年入选世界著名出版公司爱思唯尔（ Elsevier ）发布的中国高被引学者（ Most Cited Chinese Researchers）榜单。高被引学者作为主要作者和通讯作者发表论文的被引总次数在本学科所有中国（大陆地区）的研究者中处于前列水平，入选高被引科学家名单，意味着该学者在其所研究领域具有世界范围的影响力。
